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This paper explores the dynamics of microeconomic choice between 
objects with increasing returns. I t  finds that such dynamics possess four 
features: (a) a potential inefficiency of aggregate outcome, even where 
individual choices are perfectly rational; (b) an inflexiblilty of outcome, 
in tha t  market  shares become locked-in--they cannot always be influ- 
enced by standard, marginalist policy measures; (c) a non-predictability, 
in that  knowledge of supply and demand conditions does not suffice to 
predict ultimate market shares; and (d) a non-ergodicity, in that  small 
historical events are not always averaged away, but can determine the 
path of market shares. These properties are demonstrated within a sim- 
ple model where agents choose between technologies competing for 
adoption. 
Choice under increasing returns appears to  raise serious questions 
for policy prescription, for the interpretation of economic history, and 
for the possibility of constructing models for accurate economic predic- 
tion. 
ON COMPETING TECHNOLOGIES AND IUSTOFUCAL SMALL EVENTS: 
THE DYNAMICS OF CHOICE UNDER INCREASING FEIVRNS 
W. Brian Arthur 
A t t  mpts to  describe the  dynamics of markets  with increasing 
returns' (or decreasing supply costs) have long been frustrated by an  
analytical difficulty. Where objects with increasing r e tu rns  compete,  the  
marke t  outcome is usually indeterminate.  It is not difficult t o  see why. 
With increasing re turns  present in a given problem, non-convexities 
appear, so tha t  multiple equilibria are  called into being. Information on 
preferences, endowments and tranformation possibilities enables u s  to  
locate these long-run equilibria, but it is often insufficient to  tell us 
which one will be "se lec ted .  From many initial positions of interest ,  the  
system--like a pencil perfectly balanced on its point-is equally 
"attracted" by several equilibrium outcomes. We cannot say which way i t  
will "fall"; we cannot describe uniquely which path i t  will follow; hence we 
cannot pursue conventional And theory has  little further to  
say. 
As a simple example of this type of problem, consider an  island in 
which cars  a r e  introduced, all a t  more or less the same time. Drivers 
1 By contrast, the sta f ics  of economies with increasing returns is the subject of a vigorous 
literature. For general increasing-return studies, see among others, Arrow and Hahn (Ch.7, 
1971), Beato (1982), Brown and Heal (1976, 1979), Flaherty (1980), Guesneries (1975), Krug- 
man (1980), Scarf (1983), Schelling (1978), Spence (1981), and Weitzman (1982). Economies 
with increasing returns (or decreasing supply cost) commodities possess several interesting 
properties: for example, Pareto optima are not always equilibria; conversely, equilibria may 
satisfy standard first-order conditions, yet be inefficient; and not all endowment distribu- 
tions permit the attainment of optimality through trading. 
2 In the Principles (9th Ed.,p.BOs), for example, Marshall tried to  analyze the case where 
several firms with decreasing long-run cost curves compete for shares of an industry. One 
firm, he showed, eventually prevails. But which one achieves the monopoly he could not 
determine : the outcome depended on "whichever firm first gets a good start". 
a re  free to  choose between the right- and left-hand sides of the  road and  
have no in-built bias toward either.  Each side possesses increasing 
returns:  a s  a higher proportion of drivers chooses one side, the very 
real r e tu rns  to choosing tha t  side rapidly rise. Casual thought tells u s  
tha t  we would observe a good deal of randomness to  the proportions ini- 
tially driving on each side, but tha t ,  if one side by chance got sufficiently 
ahead, other drivers would "fall in" on this side, so tha t  eventually all 
cars  would drive on the  same side of the road. Of course, the side tha t  
"winsw--that comes to  "dominate the marketw--cannot be deduced in 
advance. The outcome is indeterminate.  And perhaps we mus t  conclude 
tha t  there  is little more to  be said in this  case. 
But notice, in  this ra ther  artificial example, four aspects of the  out- 
come in themselves worth investigation. First, in contrast  to  the  usual 
diminishing-returns situation, the outcome need possess no  efficiency 
properties--the side t h a t  "takes the market" need not, from any long- 
t e r m  collective viewpoint, be the  bet ter  of the  two. Second, driving is 
now locked-in to  the "chosen" side. The outcome is structurally rigid, in 
t ha t  marginal inducements to individual drivers to  change sides would 
likely prove ineffective and policy m u s t  find other means. Third, even 
though we know drivers' preferences and possibilities, e z  ante  t he  out' 
come would be hard t o  predict. "Small events" outside the  model-- 
perhaps some drivers' reactions, perhaps a dog running into the road. 
perhaps the timing or" positioning of certain traffic lights--may be cru-  
cial in deciding the  outcome. And fourth, ez  post, exact causality would 
be ha rd  to  assign--it would certainly be a mistake t o  ascribe i t  to  t he  
"superiority" of the  outcome. 
What of the indeterminacy? One way to bring i t  within analytical 
scrut iny would be to  make explicit the  "small events", ad.d t h e m  to  the  
model, a n d  examine in detailed "slow-motion" the dynamic process by 
which they  cumulate  into an  aggregate outcome. This would be difficult 
in our  imaginary example. But if it were possible in some better-defined 
case, we should want to ask by what process "small events" tend to  make 
a large difference where there  are  increasing returns,  bu t  not usually 
where there  a re  diminishing returns,  and to  what degree knowledge of 
supply and demand functions enables u s  to predict market  shares. 
In this paper we a t tempt  to explore, by way of a mathematically 
simple model, t he  dynamics of choice between objects with increasing 
returns.  We find t h a t  such dynamics typically possess four features: (a) 
a potential inefficiency of aggregate outcome, even where individual 
choices a re  perfectly rational; (b) a potential inflexibility of outcome, in 
tha t  ultimate market  shares cannot  always be influenced by standard, 
marginalist  policy measures; (c) a non-predictability, in t ha t  complete 
knowledge of supply and demand functions does not suffice t o  predict the  
path of market  shares; and (d) a non-ergodic property, in t ha t  "small 
events" a t  the  outset a r e  not averaged out and "forgotten", but  may 
"decide" the  path of market  shares.  P~~ovided  the  notion of "historical 
small events" is carefully defined, "indeterminacy" turns  out  to  be both 
amenable to analysis and  interesting in i ls own right. And we find t h a t  
choice under increasing re turns  appears t o  raise serious questions in 
t he  interpretation of economic history, in policy prescription, and in t he  
possibility of constructing models for accurate economic prediction. 
To keep the discussion concrete,  we se t  up  a model where agents 
choose between technologies competing for adoption. This use of tech- 
nologies ra ther  than goods as  the  objects of choice has a particular 
advantage. Where most goods show diminishing re turns  (in the form of 
increasing supply costs), very many technologies show increasing 
returns: often the  more a technology is adopted, t h e  more it is improved, 
and the  grea te r  i t s  payoff. Assuming each agent 's  moment  of choice t o  
be subject t o  small, but unknown events, we find tha t  t h e  market  share  
of each technology follows a stochastic proccess--in this case a random 
walk. If both technologies show standard diminishing returns,  this ran- 
dom walk has r e f l e c t i n g  barriers. The aggregate outcome is efficient, 
flexible, predictable, and ergodic. If both technologies show increasing 
returns,  t he  random walk has a b s o r b i n g  barriers.  The aggregate out- 
come is not necessarily efficient, nor  flexible, nor predictable, nor 
ergodic. 
We begin by introducing the notion of "competing technologies", 
then go on to  s e t  u p  t h e  simple model of choice. 
1. C O W r n G  TECHNOLOGIES 
A Preliminaries 
Usually there  are  several ways to  carry through any given economic 
purpose. We shall call these "ways" (or methods) t e c h n o l o g i e s  and we will 
say tha t  members  of the  set  of technologies tha t  can fulfill a particular 
purpose c o m p e t e ,  if adoption of one technology by an  economic agent 
tends t o  displace or preclude the  adoption of another.  Competition is 
mean t  here in the unconscious, passive sense: technologies, whether 
incorporated in physical plant or machinery or existing as pure method 
or pure information, a r e  assumed in this  paper to  be ope y available to 9 all, and not  subject to  strategic influence o r  manipulation. 
In this  paper competition assumes a stronger form than the  stan- 
dard diffusion case where a new and superior technology competes with 
an old and inferior one. Here two or more superior technologies com- 
pete with e a c h o t h e r  to replace an outmoded horse-and-buggy technology. 
Thus, in  the  1890s, t he  s team engine, the  electric motor, and  the  gaso- 
line engine competed, in t he  passive sense, a s  power sources for t he  new 
automobile. In t he  1800s and on into this century, spinning mules com- 
peted with ring-frames in cotton manufacturing (Saxonhouse and Wright 
1983). More recently the  nuclear technology "competes" with hydroelec- 
tric. coal, and  o ther  technologies, for part  capture of t he  electricity gen- 
eration market.  And gallium arsenide competes with doped silicon in t he  
manufacture of fast  semiconductors. 
In general i t  need not be the  case tha t  the  number  of technologies 
competing for a given purpose is few. If we consider t he  arrangement  of 
the 40 or so ke  s on a typewriter as  a technology, then  in principle 40- 
factorial or  lo4' possible keyboards compete with the s tandard QWERTY 
3 Patentable techniques, proprietary methods, and "trade secrets" do not fulf i l l  this a s  
sumption. They can be transferred at  a manipulable price, and they are not open t o  all. 
keyboard. More properly, we should call this typewriter case one of 
"competing standards" or "competing conventions": he re  t he  technolog- 
ical choices are  given and fixed. 
A technology which is not a mere  standard or convention tends to be 
fluid: it muta tes ,  changing in design and sometimes in use, typically 
existing in several or many "variants". In 1904, for example, the  s team 
automobile came in several score of forms, among which t h e  better 
known were the  Stanley, the  White, the Chelmsford, the Gardner- 
Serpollet and the  Toledo (Fletcher 1904). Choice between competing 
technologies therefore may involve selection from two o r  more collec- 
tions of "variants". 
We shall think of a given technology (or variant of i t)  as  combining a 
certain vector of economic inputs or factors for a given amount of 
desired "output", so tha t  monetary returns-in-use or payoff to adoption 
to a particular agent  a r e  simply the value of t h e  output less factor cost 
over an  appropriate t ime horizon. Almost by definition a new technology 
is subject to uncertainty,  so t h a t  i ts monetary re turn  will have a proba- 
bility distribution. Choice between competing technologies is therefore 
normally a choice between competing lotteries. 
As a particular technology spreads in use, the  payoff to  adopting it 
may change considerably. Much of t he  individual's utility in adopting a 
standard, for example, depends on t h e  degree to which others have 
adopted i t  o r  will follow suit. In the  case of a mutable technology, 
increased adoption brings a growing accumulation of experience and  
knowledge; and  this "learning by using" (Rosenberg 1982) in turn  
becomes incorporated into more efficient and reliable variants of the  
technology. (Supersonic aircraft ,  for example, improved rapidly after 
actual designs accumulated in-the-air experience.) Not all technologies. 
of course, enjoy increasing re turns  with adoption. The very popularity of 
a factor-intensive technology may bid its inputs up in price, so tha t  
diminishing r e tu rns  accompany adoption. (Hydroelectric power, for 
example, becomes costlier with increased use as  suitable dam sites 
become scarcer  and  hydrodynamically less efficient.) Time itself may of 
course be a major factor in changing re turns  to  adoption; in  our  model 
we will abstract  from this  and suppose re turns  to depend only on the 
numbers who have chosen a technology. 
B. A Simple Model with Heterogenous Adopters 
Two technologies, A and B, compete for adoption by a large number 
of economic agents who a re  currently using an outmoded technology of 
the one-horse-shay type. (For simplicity we t r ea t  the  pool of agents a s  
infinite in size.) I t  pays agent i to  retain his obsolete equipment until i ts  
demise a t  t ime ti; but  he  cannot afford t o  be without working machinery, 
so tha t  a t  this  point h e  adopts either technology A or technology B and 
holds i t  thereafter.  The variant each agent chooses is fixed or frozen in  
design a t  his t ime of choice, so  tha t  his payoff is not affected by future 
changes in  o r  fu ture  adoption of e i ther  technology. Agents a re  rational, 
they obey t h e  von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, and they are  perfectly 
informed a t  the i r  momen t  of choice: they h o w  of all current ly available 
variants of both technologies and their  payoff distributions. Agents fall 
into two types, R and S,  with equal numbers in each, the two types 
independent of the times of choice but differing in their preferences, or 
in their degree of risk-aversion, or in their economic environment. 
With these assumptions each agent can form a well-defined scalar 
utility for each technology o r  variant of it; when his t ime comes, he 
chooses the highest utility variant available and remains attached to it. 
For simplicity we suppose the  payoff-utility or re turns  to adopting A 
or B to  vary linearly with the  numbers n~ and ng who have chosen each, 
as in Table 1. 
Table 1. Returns to  ~ d o ~ t i o n ~  
We can contrast t he  dynamics of the adoption process under dimin- 
ishing, increasing, or constant re turns  regimes by allowing r and s to  be 
simultaneously negative, positive or zero. We assume aR > b R  and 
as < bS SO tha t  R-agents have a natural preference for A ,  and S-agents 
have a natural preference for B. (Later we relax linearity and several of 
the  other  simplifying assumptions.) 
We now have a well-defined, neoclassical model of choice: two types 
of agents choose between A and B. The supply cost (or returns)  func- 
tions are h o w n ,  a s  is the demand (each agent demands one unit inelast- 
ically). Of interest  are the  properties of the market  outcome--the pro- 
portion of the total technologies adopted that  belongs to type A or type B 
as the numbers of adopters increase. 
Notice tha t  we have avoided several complexities. Agents a re  
economically forced to choose, hence waiting for returns to rise is not an 
option; re turns  to a given adopter do not depend on future choices (but 
they do depend on past choices), hence expectations are not a problem; 
and technologies cannot be priced or manipulated, hence game- 
theoretical strategic maneuvering does not enter.  Each of these 
assumptions could be relaxed a t  some analyti.ca1 cost. But in this 
exploratory paper we deliberately keep the  analysis simple. 
To complete the  model, i t  remains to define a set  of "historical 
small events". Recall t ha t  in the  earlier side-of-the-road example, our 
lack of knowledge of certain events-drivers' reactions, weather condi- 
tions, traffic-light timings--caused the outcome Lo be indeterminate.  
4 More in keeping with the learning-effects literature (Steinmueller 1983) we could modify 
these returns-versus-adoption functions to be log-linear (or exponential) in form: e.g. 
ln(Uo - u) = a~ -  an^ (for technology A) and ln(lJO - U) = b R  - ang (for tech- 
nology B. The results that  follow would however be the same. 
Technology A Technoloay B 
R-Ag en t 
S-Agent 
a R  +md  
a , ~  + snd 
b R  + rn, 
bs  + sn,  
Were we to have infinitely detailed knowledge of such events and  condi- 
tions, the outcome--the side of the roa tha t  would be selected--would 
presumably be determinable in advance3  We can  conclude tha t  our  lim- 
ited discerning power, or more precisely the  limited discerning power of 
an implicit o b s e r v e r ,  caused the  indeterminacy. We may therefore 
define "historical small events" t o  be those events or conditiocs tha t  a re  
outside the knowledge of t he  observer- beyond the  resolving power of his 
"model" or abstraction of the  situation. 
To re turn  to  OUT model, we assume an  observer who has full 
knowledge of all t he  conditions and re turns  functions, e x c e p t  t h e  s e t  of 
t imes of choice i t i ] .  The observer t hus  "sees" t he  choice order as a 
binary sequence of R and S types with the  property tha t  an R or an S 
stands in t he  n t h  position in t he  line with equal likelihood, t ha t  is, with 
probability one half. 
In the analysis tha t  follows, we contrast  the  outcome--the market 
shares  gained by each technology after n agents have chosen--under 
regimes of constant returns,  diminishing returns,  and increasing 
returns.  
I t  is useful to view this  'choice process as a search procedure--the 
agents, by the i r  choices, adopting or  "exploring" along a path t h a t  con- 
sists of a mixture of A or B variants. ln principle, a t  stage n, n out of a 
total  possible Zn A and B variants could be "explored". Accordingly, we 
shall say tha t  t he  outcome of t he  choice process, viewed as  a search pro- 
cedure, is e f f i c i e n t ,  if a t  each stage n,  none of the n choices actually 
adopted (or "explored)  have lower re turns  to  ei ther  agent type than  the  
n not  adopted. If th 's is t rue,  t he  path the  choice process takes is not 6 
missing good options . 
We have built some "small-event" uncertainty into the  process--at 
least  as far as the observer is concerned--so tha t  we cannot  expect per- 
fect prediction of z, t he  market  share of A after n choices have been 
made. But we would hope t h a t  historical fluctuations ma t t e r  less, or  
average away, as  the  adoption process proceeds. Accordingly, we will say 
tha t  t he  outcome of the choice process is p r e d i c t a b l e  if t h e  observer can, 
e z  a n t e ,  construct  a forecasting sequence i Z n ]  t ha t  comes ever closer to  
the  exact market  share,  tha t  is, with t he  property tha t  1 Sn - z, 1 goes to  
zero, with probability one,  as  n goes to  infinity. 
We will say t h a t  the outcome is f l e x i b l e ,  or amenable to  marginalist 
policy intervention, if changing one of t he  technologies' re turns  func- 
tions by an  arbitrary small amount  E from any stage n onward, can affect 
the  numbers of agents choosing A or B a t  some stage in t he  future.  
5 This i s  not to deny that  "God plays dice"; i t  is merely to take the Laplacian position that ,  
given complete knowledge of the  world, t he  dice become determinate. Randomness follows 
then from lack of knowledge, and the  notion of "pure chance" need not be invoked. 
8 Except in the corlstant returns case this "greedy" choice process of adopting the  highest- 
return option a t  hand does not guarantee maximum aggregate payoff; hence we use this less 
stringent criterion of efficiency. 
Finally, we will say tha t  the outcome is ergodic if different 
sequences of historical small events, in all likelihood, lead to the same 
market  outcome--that is, if two "samples" from the  observer's se t  of pos- 
sible historical events, with corresponding time paths jz,] and jz',], 
have the property tha t  1 z, - z', I goes to zero, with probability one, as n 
goes to infinity. If this is the case, small events average out  and become 
"forgotten" as  the market  expands. 
II. MARKET SHARING AND MARKE3 EXCLUSION 
k Dynamics and Properties of the Three Regimes 
Before looking a t  the  outcome of choices in our R and S agent 
model, i t  is instructive to take a glance a t  how the  dynamics would run 
were all agents of one type only. Here choice order does not matter ;  
agents are  homogeneous and indistinguishable; and there a re  no unk- 
nown events so tha t  ergodicity is not an issue. We bypass the trivial con- 
s tant  returns case where agents always choose the  higher payoff technol- 
ogy- 
Where both technologies show diminishing returns--the standard 
textbook case--market-sharing in general takes place. As demand 
increases, adoption follows the  composite supply curve obtained from 
lateral addition of t h e  separate returns curves for each technology. 
Adopt ions  
n n A '  B 
Figure 1. 
The outcome is predictable--our observer can determine in advance 
market  shares  after n choices exactly in this situation--and i t  is easy to  
show i t  is efficient. I t  is also flexible: marginal adjustment of either 
returns curve will shift the  composite supply curve and  hence market 
share. 
Where both technologies show increasing returns, the result is more 
interesting. The first agent chooses the more favorable technology, A 
say. This enhances the returns to adopting A .  The next agent a-fortiori 
chooses A too. This continues, with A chosen each time, and B incapable 
of "getting started". The end result is that  A "corners the  market" and B 
is excluded. This outcome is trivially predictable, and efficient if returns 
rise a t  the same rate. Notice though tha t  if returns increase a t  different 
rates, the adoption process may easily become inefficient, as a cursory 
inspection of Fig. 1 shows. In this instance, not only are unadopted 
options better, but choices of B's only would have produced higher 
aggregate returns. But this situation cannot, in general, be corrected by 
marginalist policy; after n choices the  finite gap between the returns to  
A after n adoptions and the returns to  B a t  the  starting point would have 
to be closed. Flexibility is not present; and choice becomes increasingly 
"locked-in" to A .  
Now let us return to the  case of interest,  where the unknown choice 
sequence of two types of agents allows us t o  include some notion of his- 
torical "small-events". Begin with the constant-returns situation, and let 
nA(n) and nB(n) be the  number of choices of A and B respectively, when 
n choices in total have been made. We write the  difference, 
nA(n) -nB(n), as d, .  (Note that  through the variables 4 and n--the 
difference and total--we can fully describe the dynamics of the adoption 
of A versus B: in particular z,, the market share of A ,  is 0.5 + d , /  2n.) 
In this constant returns situation R-agents always choose A ,  and S 
agents always choose B, regardless of the number of adopters of either 
technology. Thus the way in which adoption of A and B cumulates is 
determined simply by the sequence in which R and S agents "line up" to 
make their choice, nA(n)  increasing by one unit if the next agent in line 
is an  R, nB(n) increasing by one unit if the next agent in line is an S , 
with the  difference in adoption, d,, moving upward by one unit or down- 
ward one unit accordingly. 
To our observer, the choice-order is random, with both agent types 
equally represented. Hence to him, the "state" 4 appears to perform a 
simple coin-toss gambler's random walk with each "move" having equal 
probability 0.5. 
In the diminishing-returns situation, these simple dynamics are 
modified. Figure 2 illustrates the returns functions of each agent type. 
Observe that ,  although a t  the outset R-agents will choose the higher- 
returns (to them) technology A ,  adoption bids its returns downward, so 
that  future R-agents will switch their preference to B if the numbers 
using A become sufficiently greater than the  numbers using B. That is, 
R-agents will "switch" their preferred choice in our model if 
Returns  t o  R-Agents L I Returns  t o  S-Agents 
Figure 2 
Adopt i o n s  
Similarly S a g e n t s  will switch preference to  A if numbers adopting B 
become sufficiently ahead of the numbers adopting A ,  tha t  is, if 
dn = n A ( n )  - ng(n) < AS 
- 
(as - bS) 
S (2) 
Adopt i o n s  
We see now (in Fig. 3) that  there are  three distinct regions in the dn ,n  
plane where the directions of choice differ. In region I, where adoption of 
both technologies shows little difference R-types choose A and S-types 
choose B. But in regions I1 and 111 both agent types choose the same 
technology--the one tha t  is "behind". Thus d, may wander a t  will in 
n  n  A '  B 
"A ' "B 
. - 
region I but cannot enter regions I1 or  111. The competitive choice pro- 
cess with diminishing returns appears to our  observer as a random walk 
with reflecting barriers. 
We obtain slightly different dynamics in the increasing returns 
situation. Now R-agents, who s tar t  with natural  preference for A ,  will 
"switch allegiance" if adoption pushes B far enough ahead of A in 
numbers and in payoff. Similarly, S-agents, with a natural  preference for 
B, will switch their choices to A if adoption pushes A far enough ahead of 
B. Regions of choice again appear in the  4 , n  plane (see Fig. 4). defined 
by inequalities similar to (1) and (2). Once region I1 or 111 is entered, 
both agent types choose the same technology, but in this case the differ- 
ence is that  they will choose the technology tha t  is "ahead ,  with the 
result  t ha t  this technology further increases its l e a d  The choice pro- 
cess is "locked into" either region 11 or region 111 from then on. In the 
4 , n  plane the  boundaries of these regions become barriers which 
"absorb" the  process. Once either is reached by random movement of 
dn, the  process ceases to involve both technologies-it is "locked-in" to 
one technology only. 
I11 
B leads 
( D i f f e r e n c e  
i n  
Figure 3. 
\R 
I I \ s  
We are now in a position to use the elementary theory of random 
walks (as in Karlin and Taylor 1975 say) to derive the properties of this 
choice process under the  different linear returns regimes. For con- 
venient reference we summarize them in Table 2. 
A d o p t i o n )  
n 
I 
Tota l  Adoptions 
Table 2. Properties of the Three Regimes 
In the  increasing-linear-returns situation, we know that  & becomes 
absorbed with probability one-that is, that  the market share of A must 
eventually become zero or  one, so that  the two technologies cannot 
coexist indefinitely and one must  exclude the other. But as in the side- 
of-the-road example, our observer cannot e z  ante predict which technol- 
ogy will predominate. He can predict that one technology will take the 
market; if he  knows random walk theory he can predict that  i t  will be A 
with probability T (aS - bS)/ ((s (aR - bR) + r (aS - bS)); but he cannot 
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Figure 4. 
predict the  actual market-share outcome with any accuracy a t  all--in 
spite of his knowledge of supply and demand functions. This s tate  of 
affairs is quite different where returns are constant,  or diminishing. In 
the constant-returns case (no barriers), the standard deviation of % 
increases with fi, so tha t  G / n  tends to zero, with probability one, as 
n  increases; and in the  diminishing returns situation (reflecting bar- 
riers) d ,  is trapped between Finite constants, so tha t  again % / n  tends 
to zero as n  increases. In both cases our observer can predict that  
market shares will become asymptotically equal with probability one, the 
fifty-fifty market split resulting from the  inherent symmetry of the prob- 
lem in this case. 
Ergodicity follows easily in  the constant and diminishing returns 
cases. Any sequence of historical events--any line-up of the agents-- 
drives the market to fifty-fifty in the  diminishing returns case; and only 
truly extraordinary happenstance events (for example, twice as many R- 
agents as S-agents joining the  line indefinitely) with associated probabil- 
ity zero can cause deviation from fifty-fifty in the  constant returns case. 
The line-up caused by the  historical timing of agent choices therefore 
has no effect on eventual market shares, and the process is ergodic-it 
forgets its small-event history. In the increasing returns case the situa- 
tion is quite different. A sizeable proportion of the choice sequences 
causes the market outcome to "tip" toward A ,  the  remaining proportion 
causes it  to ''tip" toward B. (The extraordinary line-ups--say S followed 
by R followed by ,C followed by R and  so on indefinitely--that cause 
marke t  sharing, have proportion or strictly speaking, measure,  zero.) 
Thus, the historical sequence of the choices (which depends on the  small 
events I t i ] )  decides t he  path of market  shares ,  and the  process is non- 
ergodic- i t  remembers  i ts small-event history. 
Marginalist policy adjustments to  the  re turns  trivially have no effect 
in t h e  constant-returns situation. In the  two other  cases they 
correspond to  a marginal shift of one or  both of the  barriers. Once the  
increasing-returns process is "locked-in" t o  A or B,  however, t h e  same 
technology is chosen with an ever widening returns-to-adoption differ- 
ence between i t  and  other,  and marginal subsidies or taxes can have no 
purchase on t h e  dynamics of choice in the  future.  They must  however 
affect future choices in  t h e  diminishing-returns situation (in absolute 
numbers,  if not  in  market  shares),  because reflecting barriers continue 
to  influence the  process (with probability one) a t  t imes in the future. 
The efficiency issue is different, having nothing to  do with random- 
ness. I t  is simple t o  show t h a t  choices a r e  always efficient in the 
diminishing-returns case. But with r e tu rns  increasing, i t  is very easy t o  
construct  a low-payoff "locked-in" market  t ha t  leaves options unadopted 
tha t  deliver a higher payoff. Increasing re turns  do not  guarantee effi- 
ciency. 
B. Extensions and Variations 
Would these resul ts  have been materially different if we had made 
weaker assumptions in our  model? The answer is a qualified no. 
To begin with, we can easily show tha t  the same qualitative results 
hold for N technologies in competition, and for agent types in unequal 
proportions (here  the  random walk "drifts"). Where agent numbers a r e  
finite, the "extraordinary paths" occupy a definite proportion of the pos- 
sible paths, so  t h a t  absorption or reflection now have probability some- 
what less t han  one and properties t ha t  asser t  themselves asymptotically 
may no longer fully hold. Where re turns  to  one technology depend also 
on the  numbers  adopting the  other technology, switching barriers again 
appear,  causing corresponding behavior in the  dynamics. 
Our l inear-returns results extend t o  the  nonlinear case, providing 
the  r e tu rns  functions a r e  "parallel" - in the  sense tha t  4 causes 
"switching" t o  occur  always a t  the  same numerical difference in adoption 
between t h e  two technologies. (The log-linear learning-curve re turns  of 
footnote 4 a re  parallel in this sense, for example.) Then the associated 
barriers a r e  constant,  and the  random-walk resul ts  above again obtain. 
In t he  more general case, where r e tu rns  have no common pat tern 
besides a similar monotonicity, the  results a r e  weaker. Here the  cross- 
over point a t  which the  difference in adoption 4 causes switching may 
vary a s  total  choices n increase. The barriers may widen or narrow wit 
n ,  and  if they widen a t  a sufficient r a t e  n o  switching may occur a t  all. 9 
Market-sharing is still guaranteed in the  diminishing-returns case; but  
7 Switching occurs, with probability one, only i f  the non-constant barriers lie within 
iterated-logarithm-law limits, from some finite stage onward. 
market-exclusion no longer, in the increasing-returns case. For exam- 
ple, if the increasing payoffs to learning-by-using become exhausted so 
tha t  re turns  to adoption level off a t  different levels for each technology, 
the  situation gradually becomes akin to constant returns.  Both techno- 
logies can, in this  case, share the  market. 
Three variations tha t  meri t  further study are  worth some specula- 
tive comments.  Consider first a variation where all agents differ in 
preferences, in risk aversion, or in economic circumstances (see David 
1969). There is now a distribution of agents over re turns  a t  any stage in 
the  adoption process. I t  appears that  this increased heterogeneity 
changes li t t le the  mechanism tha t  causes market-sharing or market  
exclusion. The ha rd  barriers between regions of choice now disappear, t o  
be replaced by a gradation where more and more agents have switched 
preference as  d, becomes larger. The same random walk appears, but 
now with changing step probabilities instead of barriers. Market sharing 
and market  exclusion can again be shown y d e r  appropriate conditions, 
but more sophisticated machinery is needed . 
In a quite different variation, we might suppose tha t  adoption does 
not necessarily mean a technology will be improved, it merely increases 
the  chances tha t  i t  will be improved (see Sahal 1981, David 1975, and Nel- 
son and Winter 1982, for example). There may be a wide class of such 
"probabilistic increasing-returns" models, with "small-events" now 
becoming the  discovery of improved variants. Exact market-exclusion or 
market-sharing conditions would depend on the na ture  of the model. 
Finally, where conventions or standards compete, returns usually 
become a function of future as  well as pas adoptions, so tha t  technologi- b cal expectations (Rosenberg 1982) enter.  We cannot say much in this 
case without fur ther  information on how expectations form and are  
modified a s  re turns  change. But i t  is likely that  in most cases increasing 
returns again cause market  exclusion: given sufficient increasing 
returns,  expectations of what is likely to prevail, even if founded on very 
little, can become self-fulfilling, so tha t  t he  fundamental market insta- 
bility is fur ther  exacerbated. 
8 Such as the path-dependent strong law theorem of Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski (1983). 
Market exclusion here appears to depend crucially on the extent to which agents have corre- 
lated preferences for the two technologies. 
B For an analysis of the expectations case, see the forthcoming dissertation of Hanson 
III. DISCUSSION 
k Some Technological Examples 
In our various theoretical models, the economy, under cir- 
cumstances of increasing returns, can become "locked-in" to  a future 
technological path that  is neither guaranteed to be efficient nor entirely 
predictable in advance. The most common real-world case actually con- 
forms to none of the above illustrative models. A technology is initially 
adopted as most suited to prevailing conditions; but after some time 
these conditions change. Because users and ancillary machinery h ve 7 0  become accomodatedlo this technology, however, i t  is now locked in . 
Better alternatives cannot make a start.  The 1950's programmi g 
1 f. language FORTRAN; the  excessively narrow gauge of British railroads , 
the U.S. color television system--all technologies initially adopted for 
sound engineering reasons--show that  initial adoption can carve an inef- 
ficient groove that  the  future finds hard to escape. 
The QWERTY typewriter keyboard, manifestly inefficient for modern 
touch-typing, is a case in point. Before 1073, early typewriters displayed 
a variety of keyboard arrangements, the most common being alphabeti- 
cal order for easy reference. In 1873, however, Christopher Sholes found 
that this arrangement caused his up-strike key mechanism to  jam. After 
considerable experimentation and on the advice of his brother-in-law, a 
school teacher and mathematician, Sholes minimized jamming by 
selecting a keyboard tha t  caused the typing bars to come up  from dif- 
ferent directions on most words. The first six letters were "QWERTY". 
Approximately 1000 of these "type-writers" were mass-produced in the  
Remington sewing-machine factory in New York. In due course, 
employers bought QWERTY; typists learned QWERTY; and teachers 
taught QWERTY; so that  "...other manufacturers adopted the  arrrange- 
ment with only slight variations. Those who failed to do so disappeared 
'1 2 
without a trace." (Beeching 1974) , 
Examples need not be confined to  engineering standards nor to 
trivial technologies. If road and rail "compete" as alternative possibili- 
ties for a sizeable portion of freight transported, if each mode exhibits 
increasing returns in the  form of long-run decreasing costs per ton-mile 
as its freightage increases, and if each star ts  with roughly similar costs, 
then small events --a timely lobbying effort perhaps, or the opening up  of 
a new industrial region--may favor freightage on one mode, causing its 
costs to fall and customers to switch their patronage towards it. Freight 
density on this favored mode further increases and its costs fall further. 
10 We could treat this case within our framework as one of myopic homogeneous agents 
operating in an R-environment that at  some time changes to an S-environment; or 
equivalently, as a finite sequence of R-agents, followed by an indefinite sequence of S-agents. 
11 Veblen writes in 1915 of "the silly little bobtail carriages used in British goods traffic; 
which were well enough in their time, before American or German traffic was good for much, 
but which have at best a playful air when brought up against the requirements of today." 
(See also Frankel 1955.) 
12 Not quite. The Dvornk keyboard, invented in 1932, and reported to be 35% faster than 
QWERTY, still struggles on. But of forty-five nations using Roman-alphabet languages, only 
Belgium, Portugal and Turkey today possess standard alternatives to the QWERTY keyboard, 
(See the Olympia Lnternational standard keyboards in Beeching 1974.) 
Eventually the advantaged mode comes to dominate much of the market ,  
but which m de this is may differ in different countries. Under these 
suppostionsl', where road is relatively healthy, rail would be chronically 
under-invested, requiring periodic subsidies to maintain some degree of 
efficiency; and vice-versa. 
This is not to say, of course, tha t  every case of competing technolo- 
gies shows tendencies toward marke t  exclusion. Most power-generation 
technologies, for example, a re  factor-intensive and show eventual dimin- 
ishing returns.  We would expect these to share t he  market  in a more-or- 
less predictable and efficient way. Similarly, ring and mule technologies 
shared the  cotton-spinning market  up t o  the  1920s. The ring could spin 
successfully from a narrow range of cotton grades, whereas the mule, 
although less efficient, could perform over a wider range (Saxenhouse 
and Wright 1983), with t he  result  tha t  manufacturers '  different access to 
qualities of raw cotton maintained a shared market.  
If it is t rue  tha t  competing technologies a re  often of the increasing- 
returns type, then  we would expect the past to contain a "fossil r e c o r d  
of discarded or  excluded technologies tha t  would have been as  good as, 
or, given equal development, might have been bet ter  than,  those tha t  
eventually predominated. As a pure example of this, consider t ha t  in the  
past, the  hands on certain clocks ( the  Uccello clock of 1433 in Florence 
cathedral, for example) tu rned  anticlockwise. (See also Cipolla 
1967.p.65.) After about 1550 this  convention was excluded. 
B. On Historical Explanation 
The argument  of this  paper suggests caution in the  interpretation of 
economic history. Often, where we observe t h e  predominance of one 
technology over i ts competitors--say gasoline over s team as the propul- 
sion device for automobiles--we tend t o  look for reasons why the  predom- 
inant technology was superior, and for the means by which this innate 
superiority came  to  be t ranslated into adoption. But this  form of reason- 
ing is valid only for constant  and  diminishing re turns  technologies. 
Where technologies exist potentially in  ever more efficient variants, 
superiority becomes itself a function of adoption or use. Although we 
should be cautious about engineering claims, recent  evidence (Burton 
1976; Strack 1970) suggests t ha t  had the more efficient steam-cycle been 
properly harnessed and  developed for automotive transport,  i t  might well 
have been preferable to  the  gasoline technology (see also Fletcher 
1904)14. Gasoline in North America seems to have gained i ts  decisive 
edge between 1896 and 1898 when one or two variants of t he  gasoline 
technology appeared tha t  were temporarily superior to contemporary 
s team variants.  Larger entrepreneurs  like Ransom Olds "switched into 
13 In practice, of course, this simple mechanism would be somewhat complicated by govern- 
ment regulation, cartel agreements, inter-regional differences, and the  multi-product na- 
ture of freight. Note however that  from 1870 onward, econometric studies "all give strong 
evidence of increasing returns" to  U.S. railroad freight density (Keeler 1883). 
14 The Rankine (steam) cycle is thermodynamically more efficient than the Otto (gasoline) 
cycle. In a 1970 NASA study Strack concluded that  a "steam propulsion system could be 
designed t o  weigh approximately the same as a conventional automobile propulsion system. 
The overall fuel cost wuld be no greater, and perhaps less, than today's average case." 
gasoline, and magnified its prevalence in production runs. Gasoline 
gained a small temporary lead that subsequently proved unassailable 
(May 1977). 
Seen from our analysis, the  issue in historical interpretation of 
choice of tec  ology is not quite "market determinism" versus "histori- !?E 
cal accident" . More precisely i t  is whether the  outcome is built in a- 
priori t o  the  endowments, opportunity sets,  and preferences existing in 
the economy, with aggregate choice being guided to an  inevitable con- 
clusion by an invisible hand of market determination, or whether una- 
voidable fluctuations--small events outside the given economic 
conditions-can cumulate to sway the future technological s t ructure of 
the economy. The former 
'iBses ergodicity, obtains in constant and diminishing returns regimes . Small events a re  "averaged away" and 
forgotten--the dynamics do not "notice" the presence or absence of 
headaches and horseshoe-nails, and causality lies with the  superiority of 
the market  outcome. But while this is comforting, history here is 
reduced to  the s tatus of mere carrier--the deliverer of the inevitable. 
The lat ter  case, non-ergodicity, obtains in increasing-returns regimes. 
Micro-events become magnified by positive feedbacks; their cumulation 
decides the outcome and forms the causality. Insignificant cir- 
cumstances become cemented into the technological s t ructure of the 
economy; and history, in a sense, becomes destiny. 
Historical explanation, we can conclude, should be different in the 
different returns regimes. 
C. Policy and Prediction 
The two main regimes of diminishing and increasing returns call for 
different policy action. In the diminishing returns case of two objects of 
choice competing for the  market,  it is usually best to le t  t he  superior 
aggregate choice, or the superior mix of choices, reveal itself in the out- 
come tha t  eventually dominates. But if this policy is applied in the 
increasing re turns  case there is no guarantee tha t  the "fittest" (in the 
long run  sense) will be the one that  survives. Further, if government 
seeks to maintain a healthy balance between increasing-return choices ( 
road and rail, say) by subsidizing the choice tha t  has  fallen behind, i t  
pushes policy onto a razor-edge. Small subsidies to the  excluded choice 
will not re-establish it; large subsidies, on the other hand, will swing the 
market  and drive the dominant choice out. 
15 Positions on this ancient debate run all the way from Engels, 1894 ( "In default of Na- 
poleon, another would have filled h s  place, .. .") to Croce, 102 1 ( "The material of history .. . 
[is] the fleeting network of a human world which drifts like clouds before the wind and is 
often totally changed by unimportant events."). Modem historiography ( e.g. Conrad and 
Meyer 1061) takes a comfortable compromise position that  causality is part deterministic, 
part "random". Interestingly w e  find in our variable-returns models no such compromise. 
Causality resides either deterministically within the given economic structure, or "random- 
ly" in the small events and circumstances outside the given structure. Strictly speaking, 
"random events" are not invoked or defined in this papel--only circumstances that lie out- 
side the main description of the dynamic structure. 
16 For an earlier recognition of ergodicity as a useful concept in economic history see David 
(1075, p. 16) 
More effective policies in  the increasing-returns case would be 
predicated on the  na ture  of t he  market  breakdown: in our  model agents 
myopically chose the best variant a t  hand; there  was no inter-agent 
market  to  induce them to  explore promising bu t  less-developed infant 
technologies. One possibility then ,  would be the  assignment of l imited 
rights t o  compensation by la te r  users. But this  is only partially effec- 
tive. Restricting such "patents" to tightly defined variants allows easy 
bypass by latecomers; widening i t  to  whole technologies (steam propul- 
sion, for example) restricts explaration by others.  As a second possibil- 
ity, t he  central authority could itself underwrite adoption and explora- 
tion along promising but  less popular technological paths. But again 
such policies can  be problematic. Eventual re turns  to  a technology may 
be hard t o  ascertain --witness the  controversy over solar energy subsi- 
dies, for example. And while there  a re  obvious costs to  being locked-in to  
an inferior technology, t he re  a r e  equally obvious costs t o  exploring large 
numbers of unknown technological paths. Where government does have 
a clear favored outcome, the  best course is to "tilt" the process economi- 
cally toward the  favored technology a t  the outset,  this  being especially 
effective if events are  running close t o  locking-in the  preferred choice. 
With increasing re turns ,  events a t  only certain t imes influence the  out- 
come so tha t  timing becomes all-important, whereas with diminishing 
returns timing mat te rs  little. 
Finally, a word or two about economic prediction. We have seen, in 
the illustrative model, tha t  where increasing re turns  a r e  present ,  much 
of the la te r  development of an economy may depend upon "small events" 
beneath the resolution of a n  observer's model and  so may be impossible 
to  predict with any degree of certainty. This suggests t h a t  there may be 
theoretical limits, as  well as practical ones, t o  the  predictability of the 
economic future.  Suppose we grant  econometricians, for a moment ,  full 
knowledge of future wars, of t he  timing of earthquakes, of the  formation 
of cartels, and of the technological possibilities over t h e  horizon. Sup- 
pose we grant  t hem consumate skill in finding cor rec t  econometric 
descriptions of supply and demand functions and  market  conditions. 
Suppose the economy contains processes of choice which operate subject 
to  increasing returns.  And suppose tha t  econometric models-whether 
computer-based o r  not--are of finite size and  hence of finite resolution, 
so tha t  there  a r e  real-world micro-events t h a t  lie beneath their  notice. 
Then the  inherent  potential amplification of these unnoticeable small 
event may bring into being a corresponding region of uncertain out- 
comeP7. We can  speculate t h a t  a n  econometric model t h a t  predicts 
accurately with certainty is, under these most  favorable circumstances,  
an impossibility. 
17 Similar arguments apply ( Leith 1066; Lorenz 1863) to the theoretical possibility oi accu- 
rate meteorological forecasting. The obsemiitional net would have to be finer than the ra- 
dius of the smallest eddy, else these "small events" become amplified by inherent positive 
feedbacks into large uncertainties. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we constructed a simple theoretical model of compet- 
ing technologies tha t  showed the dynamics of choice under increasing 
returns to have several important properties: historical small events 
can determine the future technological path of the economy; knowledge 
of preferences, endowments, and transformation possibilities is not 
always sufficient to predict the path the economy will follow; and the  
economy can over time become locked in to a rigid and not always effi- 
cient technological structure. 
There remains a large number of open questions, to which the con- 
ceptual framework developed here might apply. Do these properties 
obtain in all increasing returns dynamics? If not, can we characterize 
the situations where they do? What happens when we allow strategic 
manipu'lation, as would be likely with competing products? What happens 
if returns depend also on future choices? What difference does it make if 
agents can wait for returns to  increase? Under what circumstances 
would we see similar, increasing-returns properties in the  dynamics of 
international trade, of economic development, or of industrial struc- 
ture? What policies might prove effective in particular cases? 
Whether the  theoretical properties obtained in this paper apply to 
some portion of the  actual economy remains to be empirically proven; if 
they do standard conventions in policy prescription, historical interpre- 
tation and economic prediction may have to be revised. 
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